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more money balances relative to its income
because the return on securities becomes
less attractive. Therefore, the income velo-
city ofMl will fall.
In fact, monetaristequations alreadycapture
the changes in velocity caused by lower or
higher inflation, making the estimated
response of inflation to changes in past
monetary growth greater than one-to-one
over any but the longest periods. Therefore,
some non-monetary shock must have pro-
duced a larger amountofeconomic slack-
and therefore larger declines in inflation,
nominal interest rates, and velocity-than
could have been predicted on the basis of
the past deceleration in monetary growth.
The main source ofthis shock lay in the
foreign trade sector.
However, this well-established positive
relationship between interest rates and
velocity cannot fully explain the failure of
monetarist models to account for the recent
drop in inflation. Ifthe drop in inflation and
nominal interest rates were the only expla-
nation ofthe sharp decline in velocity, then
the decline in velocity cannot be used to
explain the large decline in inflation, orelse
the reasoning becomes circular.
Net exports and the exchange rate
An extraordinary decline in net exports of
$25.3 billion (in 1972 dollars), plus simul-
taneous inventory adjustments, accounted
for all ofthe decline in U.S. production
during the 1981-82 recession (see chart).
Although the recession officially began in
July 1981, real final sales (GNP less inven-
tory investment) had already flattened out at
the beginningofthat year; they declined by
$3.6 billion (in 1972 dollars) overthe
two-year period. However, real final sales
are augmented by export sales and reduced
by imports. The underlying stre'lgth ofthe
demand ofdomestic purchasers is thus
equal to real final sales less net exports.
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Economic slack and monetary growth
Economic slack models stress that high
monetary growth boosts inflation only if it
raises real aggregate demand enough to
lowerthe rate ofunemploymentand thereby
putupward pressure on wages and prices. In
the past, monetary models have tended to
capture the short-run association between
monetary growth and economic slack, but
beginning in 1982, the monetary model
overpredicted inflation badly. Evidently, the
increase in economic slack in late 1981 and
1982 was larger than could have been pre-
dicted solelyon the basis ofthe past slowing
in monetary growth.
Monetary models that rely on current and
past M 1 growth overpredicted inflation
significantly in 1982 and 1983, while fore-
casting models based upon the effects of
economic slack performedquite well. For
1984, a monetary model forecasts an infla-
tion rate of9.2 percent in the personal
consumption deflator, excluding food and
energy, but both a "slack" model and a
consensus of professional forecasters
predict inflation of5V2 to 6V2 percent. Our
purpose in this Letter is to explore in some
detail why the monetarist model "broke
down" in 1982.
The proximate reason for why monetary
models broke down in 1982 was the
unusual decline in the income velocity of
mohey or, in other words, its rate ofturn-
over. Between the fourth quarter of 1981
and the first quarter of 1983, the income
velocity ofM1 declined at a 5;5-percent
annual rate in contrast to its long-term
positive growth trend of3 percent. What
caused this decline in velocity? One reason
was the sharp drop in the inflation rate, and
nominal interest rates along with it, that
occurred between 1981 and 1982. This
changed the relationship between monetary
growth and aggregate demand. At lower
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From the beginning of 1981to the rec:ession
trough at the end of 1982, real final sales to
domestic purchasers actually increased by
$21.7 billion. Therefore, if real net exports
had notdeclined, real final sales would have
grown by $21.7 billion; and the recession
would have been much less severe or per-
haps even avoided.
It is widely agreed that a sharp appreciation
in the foreign exchange value ofthe dollar
wasthe fundamental cause ofthe decline in
net exports. Between 1980 and 1982, the
real value ofthe dollar(adjusting for
changes in foreign price levels relative tothe
u.s. price levelL rose by morethan 30 per-
cent on atrade-weighted basis. The most
importantreason forthis extremely large rise
was the increase in U.s. real interest rates
(nominal rates adjusted for inflation) relative
to real interest rates abroad. Higherreal U.s.
interest rates made investment in this coun-
try attractive to foreigners, who bid up the
real value ofthe dollar in foreign exchange
markets. After a period oftime, real appre- :
ciation ofthe dollar reduced the quantity of
U.S. exports and increased the quantity of
imports. Lesser, but possibly significant,
additional factors strengthening the dollar
have been recent changes in U.s. tax law
that give morefavorable treatmentto capital
investment in the United States and in-
creased risk on investments in other parts of
the world.
Money not the only cause
Monetarist models failed to capture the
effectofamuch strongerdollarin generating
economic slack by reducing net exports
that, in turn, contributed to the large decline
in inflation. M1 growth slowed from 8.1 per-
cent in 1978 to 7.4 and 7.2 percent in 1979
and 1980, respectively, and to 5.1 percent in
1981. Such a slowing should tend to raise
real short-term interest rates, and hence the
real exchange rate, temporarily by first
reducingthe growthofreal money balances.
,As the price level adjusts in the long-run,
however, the real stock ofmoney, real inter-
est rates, and the real exchange rate should
return to normal.
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We have estimated an econometric equa~
tion embodying the monetary model of
inflation over the period from 1964 through
1980. This equation does not capture even
the temporary nexus between monetary
growth and the real exchange rate because,
in the first place, until 1973, exchange rates
were fixed underthe Bretton Woods system
and bore no relationship to year-to-year
movements in money. Moreover, in the per-
iod between 1973 and 1980, when ex-
change rates beween majorcurrencies were
aIlowed to float, a statistical test reveals that
changes in the real exchange rate were not
significantly related to current and past
monetary growth-the influence of other
factors dominated. And although anegative
relationship does exist between the level of
the real exchange rate and monetary
growth, itfails to hold into the forecast
period beyond 1980. Consequently, our
monetarist equation for forecasting inflation
couId not have predicted the effectofthe
sharp rise in the real exchange rate that
actually occurred.
While the slowing in nominal monetary
growth that occurred prior to 1982 contri-
buted to atemporary increase in real interest
rates (real M 1 declined by over 4 percent a
year between 1979and 1981)that madethe
dollar so strong, it is only one ofthe con-
tributing factors. The reduction in the
growth of nominal M 1 accounted for less
than halfofthe reduction in real M1 growth
during this period. The dominant influence
on real M 1 was an acceleration of inflation,
strongly fueled by shocks from food and
energy prices.
More importantly, the strength ofthe effect
ofhigherreal short-term interest rates on the
real exchange rate depends upon how long
high real rates are expected to last, or,
equivalently, whether they are transmitted
to real long-term interest rates. Ifa real
interest rate differential on a 1-year bond of
3 percentage points in favor ofthe United
States is expected to last for ayear, it could
boost the real exchange rate above its long-Trough of Recession
The 1981·1982 Recession
trade sector. During the 1981 ~8Zrecession,
the drop in real final demand was led by a
drop in real net exports. Slower monetary
growth contributed in expected degree to
weakness in such sectors as consumer dur-
ables, housing, and business fixed invest-
ment. But the evidence indicates that an
appreciation in the real foreign exchange
value ofthe dollar, which was the key factor
in the sharp drop of net exports, could not
have been accurately predicted from the
previous slowing in monetary growth. The
most important influence on the real
exchange rate was the expectation ofcon-
tinued high real interest rates created by
renewed international confidence in U.s.
monetarystabilityand bythe anticipationof
large federal budget deficits.
The decline in net exports contributed
greatly to the increase in economic slack,
that was mainly responsible for the subse-
quentdrop in inflation. The reduction in real
aggregate demand caused bythe dropin net
exports helped to produce adecline in the
income velocity ofM 1, at first directly, and
later indirectly as less inflation led to lower
nominal interest rates. Because ofthis quite
independent effect ofnet exports upon
aggregate demand and economic slack, the
decline in inflation was considerablygreater
than predicted by monetarist forecasting
equations. Adrian W. Throop
Two readily identifiable factors contributed
to market expectations that high real short-
term interest rates would last for some time.
First, because the Administration supported
the Federal Reserve's efforts to reduce the
rate of monetary growth, international
investors renewed their confidence in the
ability ofthe United States to pursue a
course ofstable monetary policy. Such a
policy reduces thelikelihood that real inter-
est rates could be temporarily depressed by
excessive monetary stimulation in the
future. Second, after passage ofthe Eco-
nomic Recovery Tax Act in the Summer of
1981, it soon became clear that the struc-
tural, or cyclically adjusted, federal budget·
deficit would grow very substantially in the
future. The demand ofthe federal govern-
ment for credit would therefore be'expected
to keep future real short-term interest rates
high.
Conclusion
The solution to the puzzleofwhy monetarist
equations for forecasting inflation have
broken down recently lies in the foreign
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run value by only 3 percent. That is, the
expected return ofthe exchange rate to its
long-run value would just offset the extra
yield on the bond. But ifthis differential
were anticipated to last for 10 years, the real
exchange rate should rise by 30 percent.
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Outstanding Selected Assets and liabilities
Large Commercial Banks
BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)
3/7/84 2/29/84 Dollar Percent
Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 176,691 -1,010 666 1.7
Loans and Leases1 6 156,418 - 993 1,063 3.1
Commercial and Industrial 46,636 373 673 6.7
Real"estate 59,276 46 377 2.9
Loans to Individuals 26,947 - 2 296 5.1
Leases 5,011 5 - 50 - 4.6
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 12,184 - 3 - 322 - 11.8
Other Securities2 8,088 - 13 - 75 - 4.2
Total Deposits 185,698 - 295 - 5,298 - 12.7
Demand Deposits 43,364 - 872 - 5,872 - 54.4
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 29;102 403 - 2,229 - 32.5
OtherTransaction Balances4 : 12,467 462 - 307 - 11.0
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 129,867 114 882 3.1
Money Market Deposit
Accounts-Total 40,524 151 927 . 10.7
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 37,971 - 113 - 193 - 2.3
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 19,327 - 894 - 3,679 - 73.0
Weekly Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings
Net free reserves (+)/Net borrowed(-)
Weekended Weekended Comparable




1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes u.s. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowing via FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items not shown separately
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